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

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**FEW REMARKS**

ON

**OUR FOREIGN POLICY.**

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*SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.*

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FEW REMARKS

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OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

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“ Non minus esset Imperatoris, *consilio* superare quam *gladio*.”

CÆS. de Bell. Civ. I. 72.

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*SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.*

LONDON:

JAMES RIDGWAY AND SONS, PICCADILLY.

1836.



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# REMARKS

ON

## OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

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WHEN a person is engaged in some favourite pursuit which he follows up with ardour and perseverance, his mind is so exclusively occupied by it, that he seldom pays attention to any other object. It is the same with nations, the public mind seldom embraces two objects at the same time, hence when a country is engaged in a popular war, its internal affairs are generally neglected, and its Ministers commit acts only to be tolerated when overshadowed by the glories of a Nelson, or a Wellington. It was therefore very natural that during the last twenty years of peace, we should gradually have paid more attention to the state of our laws and institutions, and have become at length quite indifferent to the foreign policy of the country, until aroused from our lethargy by the warning voice of one who perceived the abyss into which this indifference was leading us.\*

\* I allude particularly to that excellent work "England and Russia," which I am overjoyed to see has reached a fifth edition, a

I can easily conceive that the Conservative and Tory may be opposed to Reform, and the Whig and Radical opposed to any interference in the affairs of other countries which might by any possibility lead to a war, and that both parties may act from the purest and most patriotic motives; for I deprecate the idea of making patriotism the exclusive property of a party, no matter by what name that party may be designated. Patriotism is inherent in an Englishman, and animates him from the cradle to the grave, and though it may sometimes be latent, it will burst forth with greater intensity in the hour of danger, when faction rages at home, or an enemy dares to insult "the meteor flag" abroad. A Conservative may be conscientiously opposed to Reform, because he may justly fear that if the public mind be exclusively occupied by this all-absorbing subject, the foreign relations of his country may be neglected, her glory tarnished, her power undermined, and that she may at length fall from the proud station which she now occupies, and notwithstanding all her newly acquired liberties, may easily become the prey of a continental despot, and those very liberties be swept away together with our laws and institutions, and every thing else

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proof that the startling facts therein recorded, together with the unanswerable arguments of its highly talented author, have made a due impression on the public mind. If a "Russo-phobia" should have been produced, I trust that it will be too strong for any "Manchester Manufacturer" to "cure."

which renders home so dear to an Englishman. On the other hand, a Reformer may deprecate all foreign wars, and all interference in the affairs of other countries, from motives equally as pure and equally as honourable. His greatest wish is to reform every abuse in Church and State; that abuses exist all parties allow, they only differ respecting their nature and extent. The wish in itself is therefore laudable, and if the Reformer foresee that a war would impede reform, he may conscientiously oppose every measure which might by any possible chance lead to one, and even be induced to sacrifice the dignity of his country, in order to promote what he considers to be of a more paramount importance.

These exclusive views have given rise to two parties, the one opposed to all reform, the other equally opposed to intervention; these are the Tories and Radicals. The Conservatives and the Whigs, strive to establish a *juste milieu* with about the same degree of success that *juste milieu* measures generally meet with. Now the question is whether it would not be possible to have a Government which should reform all *real* abuses at home, and at the same time maintain our power and dignity abroad. This is a political problem, for the solution of which it is first requisite that the true Foreign Policy of a country like ours be clearly pointed out; a task which I now undertake with diffidence, but with the firm resolution not to let any national prejudices, or the opinions or interests

of any party or sect exercise the least influence on my judgment.

There is a certain class of politicians who lay down as incontrovertible truths, First, That we are the greatest and most powerful people on earth, and shall always remain so. Secondly, That this greatness is entirely owing to our free institutions, and our insular position; and, lastly, That in order to preserve and increase this greatness and power, we have only to render our institutions still more free, and our position if possible still more insular, in short that we have only to mind our own affairs, and not meddle with those of any other people—remaining in every sense of the words

“*penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.*”

Nay, some of the *isolators* go so far as to say, that if any of our Colonies were to revolt, we ought immediately to acknowledge their independence. They seem to think that it would be better if we had no Colonies at all: they would even consent to abandon Gibraltar, Malta, and Heligoland; and some of them would not hesitate throwing away the isles of Jersey and Guernsey, and the other remnants which we still retain of France. Their maxim is, that free institutions and an insular position are all that we require. Unless some convulsion of nature should dry up the Channel and unite us again to the Continent, or unless these institutions be trampled under foot by a monarchical, or aristocratical

despotism, we shall have nothing to fear. Let Continental nations, say they, fight out their own battles ;—what does it matter to us how they divide Europe ?—what does it matter, whether the French re-acquire their *natural limits*, or the Russians bivouac in the streets of Constantinople ? England will always remain the first country in the world.

There are others who are equally as desirous of reform as the *isolators*, but who are, at the same time, fully aware of the necessity of paying some attention to our Foreign Policy : their plan, however, is *first* to reform all abuses in Church and State, and *then* to mind what is going forward abroad. Now, if we could effect all these numerous reforms during the next Session, it would, perhaps, be as well to wait ; but what chance is there of a tenth part of the motions made by Reformers being converted into laws ? A few will be passed and the rest adjourned until the next Session ; and, in the mean time, an incessant agitation will be kept up, and the public mind will be too much occupied with the clashing interests of rival Churches to bestow much attention on the designs of Russia and France. As I, therefore, do not see the least prospect of the real or imaginary abuses in Church and State being reformed for several years to come, I think it high time that the public should attend a little more to our Foreign Policy if they wish to see England still maintain that lofty station which she now holds. They may rest assured, that the only

way to do this, is to *meddle* a great deal in the affairs of other countries; for, if the present system should continue much longer, they will learn to their sorrow, that neither our free institutions, nor our insular position, will preserve us from the fate which inevitably attends a powerful people too exclusively occupied by the struggles of Parties and Factions at home to pay due attention to its interests abroad.

But what are these interests? What, in a word, is the true system of Foreign Policy for a country like ours? We hear a deal of talk about an alliance of the West of Europe against the East—an alliance of the *free* Western Governments against the *despotic* Northern ones—an alliance which is said to be founded on principles—that is to say, that as France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, have, or are rather said to have, Constitutions analogous to our own, they must necessarily feel a kind of friendship for us, and that France especially, being now *so free*, must naturally go hand in hand with England, and England and France become, in short, a political Orestes and Pylades. Now, nothing can be more absurd than this argument. In the first place, I deny that one of the parties at least, that France possesses institutions any ways analogous to our own; and I maintain that those of Germany are much more analogous; but taking it for granted that they were, nay, that they were perfectly similar, does it follow that the *interests* of

the two countries should be the same. Would similar institutions prevent France from pursuing a system of aggrandizement, or from becoming a great maritime power?

The only true system of Foreign Policy for any country, is that founded on interest: if the interests of one of the contracting parties be alone promoted, or promoted in a much greater degree than that of the other, the alliance may be of momentary utility, but cannot be durable. The only durable alliances are those founded on mutual and permanent interests, and such interests are chiefly the result of geographical position, while those on which temporary alliances are formed, are generally the interests of a Dynasty, or a Faction, and frequently in direct opposition to the real interests of the nation.

Now, in respect to England, I suppose even the isolators will allow that we ought to keep up our naval superiority at any price; in fact, the day we shall cease to be masters of the sea, we shall also cease to exist as a nation; for once let the triumphant fleets of either France or Russia sweep the Channel with impunity, and we should soon behold the *Pantalons garances* parading in St. James', or hear the Calmucks of Tartary yelling out their savage hurrahs over the flames of our manufactories. But such things must not, and I am well aware never will take place, for if we should be compelled to fight the great battle, it will be fought gallantly,



the "meteor flag of England" will be nailed to the mast, and the recollections of centuries of glory animate her sons to deeds worthy of the heroes of Creci and Agincourt, of Blenheim and La Hogue, of Trafalgar and Waterloo. But suppose the struggle began,—a struggle of life or death for us, a struggle which would leave us either a free and powerful people, or the contemptible slaves of Russia or France—suppose our enemies to have a naval force much superior to that which we should be able to muster ; or, in other words, suppose that the successor of our former magnanimous ally, the Autocrat of all the Russias, and our present excellent friend His Majesty Louis Philippe King of the French, should gradually increase their navies ; and we, in the mean time,—being occupied in discussing articles of faith and what not, should suffer ours to decay, or, at least,—following the saving system now so much in fashion, should lay two-thirds of our vessels up in ordinary, and vote but an annual pittance scarcely sufficient to keep the rest afloat. Now, in this state of things, suppose those two personages should discover that it would be their mutual interest to form an offensive and defensive alliance against England. Then would commence a struggle which would shake our empire to its foundations, and it would require all our skill, courage, and perseverance, joined to our immense national wealth and resources, to preserve us from total destruction. We should then hear

our merchants and manufacturers, ay, even "Manchester manufacturers" cursing the day when their Representatives neglected our natural bulwarks, or our Ministers lost sight of the true interests of the country, amidst a ceaseless clamour for economy and reform.

God grant that such things may never take place. Now, in my opinion, the only way to prevent them taking place is, on the one hand, always to have a commanding naval force *ready* for action; and on the other, to keep on good terms, and to cultivate the friendship of our *natural allies*. But, it will be asked, who are our natural allies? I answer, that the natural allies of Great Britain are those nations who have little or no chance of ever becoming a maritime power; and her natural enemies are those who have that chance. Our whole system of Foreign Policy should be grounded on these principles; we should strive to form permanent alliances with inland nations, or with those who have only a very remote chance of ever becoming powerful at sea. If the germs of maritime greatness exist in a country, we should prevent those germs from ripening into maturity, and seize on any pretext for nipping them in the bud, when the risk and expense would not be too great, and thus avoid those numerous evils which a less hardy policy would inevitably entail on our children.

This will be called an odious policy, but odious as it may at first sight appear, it can easily be

justified. Nations, like individuals, have a right to preserve their existence, and to destroy whatever may threaten that existence. Now, Continental nations can exist and even become powerful and mighty without possessing the sovereignty of the ocean; but for us this sovereignty is a *sine qua non*, for the moment any other power becomes decidedly superior to us at sea, we shall lose our political existence, our Colonies will be lopped off, our commerce annihilated, and the mother country itself at last obliged to endure all the horrors of another conquest. We are the only people whose political existence entirely depends on a navy. France and Russia would remain great and powerful without a single ship, consequently, if those powers should increase their respective navies beyond what the protection of their trade should require, we shall have reason to conclude that it can only be with the *arrière pensée* of attacking us, and shall therefore be perfectly justified in anticipating the attack by a declaration of war, or in embarrassing them by favouring any party, legitimate or illegitimate, which may be in opposition to their existing Governments.

From what has been said, it is manifest that our most natural allies are the Germans, and our most natural enemies, or to use a less odious word, our natural rivals, the French and Russians. Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, have not sufficient resources ever to become very powerful at sea, but as their re-

spective fleets would strengthen those of an adversary, we ought to keep on good terms with them, which will not be difficult, for Holland will always be more inclined to form an alliance with England than with France, and the Scandinavian powers will always prefer us to Russia. The same may be said of Turkey, whose importance the public only began to appreciate after the Greek mania was over, and do not seem even now fully to appreciate it, notwithstanding all that has lately been written on the subject. Spain was once a great maritime power, and under a good government, might become so again, but the period is far too remote to cause us any uneasiness, and for years to come it will be of the greatest advantage for us to have her for an ally. Our true Foreign Policy is consequently to form and to strengthen, by every means in our power, a bond of union among all the remaining European states, against France and Russia, a task which would not be so difficult as it may at first view appear, for it fortunately happens that the *true interests* of the greater part of these States would be promoted by such a league.

I know that it has been the fashion of late to boast of our alliance with France, to regard that alliance as a master stroke of policy, and to expect from it the pacification of the world. Now I do not deny that an alliance with France may at times be of a temporary utility to England; it will always be well to take advantage of the ridiculous pre-

judices which the French have against the Russians, and do all that we can to render them averse to an alliance with that power, all this is well and good, but to expect any permanent advantage from such an alliance is absurd. It is impossible for France to be our natural ally, she will always remain our rival, if not our enemy, for the simple reason that she may become a great maritime power; and what is more, may easily acquire the ambition to become one. France, with a population of 32 millions of an active, intelligent, warlike people, will always be one of the first countries in the world, and history shews what the French are capable of, when well directed. If they should ever have a maritime Napoleon for a ruler, it would require all the courage and perseverance of our gallant tars to maintain our sovereignty of the ocean. France must therefore be watched closely; as long as she does not increase her navy, we may keep on good terms with her, but a formal alliance is absurd; for, in the first place, what reliance can be placed on the present apostate Government? men who have abjured every principle which they professed for 15 years, will not be over nice in betraying an ally; and, secondly, what advantage can we derive from such an alliance? I answer none whatever, either in peace or war. In time of peace, it will be a disadvantage, as it will alienate our natural allies, which I fear it has done already; and in time of war I will maintain, paradoxical as it may appear,

that it would be better to have France for an enemy than for an ally; for even supposing that Louis Philippe would consent to form an alliance with England against Russia, in case of a war, his Government would soon be upset, and replaced by a Republican Propagandism; but if even Louis Philippe were suffered to remain on his throne, a successful war would always end in French aggrandizement. They would at any rate re-acquire what they are pleased to term their *natural limits*,\* and though such an alliance might have procured us many temporary advantages, those advantages,

\* It is absurd in the French to imagine that the Rhine forms the natural limits of their country. The natural limits of a country are the limits of its fluvatile basins—the natural limits of a people are where its language ceases to be spoken. Now Rhenish Prussia, Rhenish Bavaria, and Alsace, belong all three to the basin of the Rhine, and all their inhabitants speak German—they consequently belong to Germany, both geographically and ethnographically, and instead of acquiring the two former, the French ought to abandon the latter if they have such a great desire to keep within their natural limits. Savoy, it is true, according to this system, would belong to them, but on the other hand, they would be obliged to give up Corsica; if, therefore, they sigh for aggrandizement, let it at least be founded on a more plausible pretext than that of acquiring their natural limits.

If the allies had known what they had been about, and not been so intoxicated with victory, they would have pent them up within those limits in 1814—in their real geographical limits, namely, the basins of the Somme, Seine, Loire, Garonne, and Rhone; but I suppose it was the “magnanimity” of Alexander that saved them—he at least was *sober*, and foresaw that it would be bad policy to weaken a *future ally*.

however great, would be more than counterbalanced by the increase of power of a rival, and the moral influence which that rival would acquire from a successful war, terminated by her assistance.

Louis Philippe, however, in case of war, would be more inclined to form an alliance with Russia, and in so doing would act perfectly right, and would shew that he had a much clearer view of the true interests of his country than the greater part of his subjects. After the Revolution of July, when he found himself placed on a *bourgeois* throne, which he even then had the idea, according to Talleyrand, of metamorphosing into a royal one—the alliance with England was of the greatest advantage to him, as it prevented the Northern Powers from attacking France before she was sufficiently prepared for defence, and gave the wily Monarch time to begin the said royal metamorphosis, by *cutting* his *bourgeois* acquaintance. The Citizen of Two Worlds was quietly laid on the shelf, the Banker Minister sent to balance his ledger, Monsieur Mouton placed at the head of the Parisian “braves,” and the royal hands grasped more firmly the indispensable *parapluie* and cockaded hat, to avoid the tact of any Chiffonier hero of “the three glorious days,” who might be still tempted to seize them for a fraternal shake, all to the good King and the old ex-Bishop’s great satisfaction. Now as long as this tottering throne of his shall continue to be assailed by factions, our alliance will continue to be useful to him;

for if we were his enemies, we might side with one of these factions, and then both he and the "*Ainé*" of his *race*, and little Thiers, and all the other worthies who congregate around the throne and telegraph of his August Majesty, would soon find out, to their cost, that it would require but the nod of a British Minister to put an end for ever to the mountebank tricks which they have been in the daily habit of performing during the last five years.

But should Louis Philippe succeed in establishing his Government on a solid foundation, which is however very problematic, and should have nothing to fear from internal dissensions; he will, I make no doubt, shake us off as easily as he did his republican "camarades" and fraternize with the Czar. In fact, he would by so doing only be following the true system of French policy, which ought always to tend more towards an alliance with Russia than towards one with England.

Surrounding nations have sustained too much injury from the French, and have too well grounded a fear of French aggrandizement and propagandism ever to become their allies. After the Revolution of July they might have succeeded in stirring up the Italians against the Austrians, but even this they would not be able to do now. All their neighbours are prejudiced against them; they are disliked by the Italians, despised by the Germans, and utterly detested by the Spaniards. Now every one must allow, that individually the French are



a most polite, amiable, agreeable, intelligent people, but they have unfortunately a good portion of vanity, and it is this vanity which makes them regard any form of ephemeral government which in their numerous revolutions they may be pleased to adopt, as the very archetype of perfection, not only admirably adapted for themselves but also peculiarly fitted for every other nation;—hence their spirit of propagandism and political intolerance. It is fortunate for England that this national vanity often renders them blind to their own interests, which is the case in regard to Russia.

The antipathy to Russia, however, is dying away; and I am convinced myself that if Louis Philippe be able to consolidate his government, the drapeau tricolor will float by the side of the Czar's eagle, to the no small astonishment of our Philo-gallic politicians, who dream of alliances founded on principles—on the principles of Representative Government, forsooth! as exemplified in a French Chamber of Deputies and a Spanish Cortes!!!

This quasi-alliance between France and England has now lasted five years; it may have preserved the peace of Europe, when war would probably have been better for England; but except this be an advantage, which is very questionable, I know of none that we have derived from it. I can only see disadvantages, not one of the least of which is to have alienated our natural allies the Germans

and Dutch, by our unnatural alliance with their greatest enemies. All the advantages, in fact, are on the side of France. This alliance preserved her from invasion at a time when she was not prepared for it : owing to it she has been able to organize a well disciplined army, to repair her dilapidated fortresses, to increase her navy, and obtain a firm footing in Africa, where she has laid the foundation of an empire pregnant with future danger to England, an empire which may one day become as extensive as the one we have acquired in India, and cause our children to rue the day when such short-sighted policy thus enabled a rival to increase her power. It is really sickening to read in newspapers, purporting to be written by Englishmen, a justification of this conquest. "Has not France," say these sapient politicians, "as much right to keep possession of Algiers as we have of Malta or Gibraltar?" I answer, no; because Malta and Gibraltar serve to keep up our dominion of the sea, without which we could not exist as a nation; whereas France could exist, has existed, and actually does exist as a great and powerful nation without this dominion; consequently every step which she takes towards acquiring it, may be considered as an attack on our political existence, which we have a natural right to defend; and that the conquest of Algiers is such a step, is too evident to stand in need of an argument. It is some consolation that the fickleness of the French character

renders the permanent occupation of this colony somewhat doubtful ; they may one day take it into their heads to abandon it without any very apparent cause. It were to be wished, however, that such a desirable event might be owing more to British firmness than to French caprice.

From what I have said I think it is quite clear that England can never expect to find a faithful ally in France, nor France one in England, the interests of the two countries coming too often in conflict.

It will not be necessary for me to enter into details to shew that Russia is our most powerful rival, and our greatest enemy ; this has of late been clearly demonstrated, not only in that excellent work " England and Russia," which cannot be too often read, but also in several well written articles in the Magazines and Reviews, not to mention the documents published in the " Portfolio." Her gigantic progress has therein been traced, her secret designs pointed out, and her whole system of foreign policy laid before the public. Although I agree with the writers of these articles as to the nature and extent of these designs, I am very far from blaming Russia for pursuing them, or from stigmatizing her policy as perfidious ; an expression which comes with a very bad grace from us who have subjugated India, not always by the most honourable means. The foreign policy of Russia shews that the destinies of that Empire have long

been wielded by real statesmen, by men who have had minds capable of conceiving a vast plan, and courage and perseverance to pursue that plan unremittingly from generation to generation, in spite of every obstacle which their enemies may have raised up against them, until at last they are on the eve of seeing it accomplished. And because this system of policy, of true Roman policy, clashes with our interests, it has become the fashion to call the Russians barbarians, and to lavish all kinds of abusive epithets both on the people and on their rulers,\* at the same time feeling quite indignant if they should recriminate and dare to bestow the same epithets on us. This, to say the least, shews very bad taste ; and if the writers in question had

\* I allude more particularly to newspaper articles. The author of " England and Russia " indulges now and then in a little invective, it is true ; but he has given us more than invective, he has given us facts, and an admirable train of reasoning on those facts. His exertions against the *common enemy* have been, and still continue to be, so great, and the talents which he has displayed are of such a high order, that any one fighting under the same banner will be proud in acknowledging him for a leader. Would to God that Government had followed his counsels—if the bold and vigorous measures which he proposed had been adopted, a fresh volunteer in the cause would not now be required, for that cause would have been gained. But the measures which would have gained it *then*, cannot even be employed *now*. France would *then* have been compelled to have followed us, *now* not the least reliance can be placed on her ; hence, although I have not the honour of being personally known to him, I will venture to assert that the author himself must *now* see the necessity of following a more cautious line of policy.

resided a few years in Russia, they would perhaps have discovered that the Russians are far from being barbarians; that their rich, flexible, sonorous language is in many respects superior to our own Frenchified Anglo-Saxon; and their literature, though not teeming with the "Observations, Remarks, Sketches, and Personal Narratives" of a host of travelling gentlemen, possesses, notwithstanding this great deficiency, numerous works of sterling merit, which would reflect honour on any age or country. They might also have found to their no small astonishment, that the social condition of a Russian serf is preferable to that of a Manchester operative; that the greater part of these serfs are well fed and well clothed, and in the enjoyment of health and contentment, blessings denied to the generality of emaciated beings who consume their lives amidst the pestilential atmosphere of our manufactories; and they might finally have remarked that a Russian, when he reflects on the growing power of his country, and on the gigantic progress she has made and is daily making both in arts and arms, can feel himself animated with as genial a glow of patriotism as ever warmed the breast of a Briton.

But Poland and the Poles! those writers will say, Is not the Emperor's conduct in regard to that noble people truly barbarous? Russia, after having acquired possession of Poland by a system of perfidy, now seizes on the plausible pretext of

an unsuccessful rebellion to erase her very name from the map of Europe, offering her unfortunate inhabitants the cruel choice, either of changing their language and religion, or of being driven like herds of cattle to perish amidst the deserts of Siberia. We often read such language as this in the newspapers, and it answers very well the purpose for which it was intended. It may also do well enough in a dinner speech to stigmatize the Emperor Nicholas as a barbarian, an autocratic despot, and so forth, and may often answer party purposes to make use of such abusive epithets; but in the mouth of a statesman they are ridiculous, for he at least ought to know that Nicholas, as Emperor of Russia, cannot act otherwise than he does without sacrificing the true interests of his country. For if it be our interest to see Poland a free and independent kingdom, it is equally the interest of the Czar to destroy its independence by transforming it into a Russian Province, and thus rendering it as subservient to his will as any other Province of his vast Empire. It is therefore quite natural that he should treat the Poles as a conquered people; and however harsh that treatment may be, it will meet with the unanimous approbation of his Russian subjects; an approbation which, no doubt, makes him perfectly indifferent to any thing which foreign writers may be pleased to declaim on the subject.

Far be it for me to attempt to palliate the cruel-

ties which the Russians have been guilty of in Poland. I abhor those cruelties, perhaps, equally as much as those who expatiate so largely on them ; and though I am convinced that they have been greatly exaggerated for party purposes, still deeds have been done, which can only be justified by admitting a very dangerous principle, a principle which, if generally admitted, might be alleged in justification of every crime, both public and private, and therefore if admitted at all, ought never to be acted upon by statesmen, except with great restrictions. The principle is this—that the governments of this world are analogous to that of the Supreme Being, who pervades the universe, and are therefore authorized in producing a partial evil to effect a permanent good. Now, if Russian statesmen admit this principle, and act upon it with *honest intentions*, the crimes committed in Poland ought only be ascribed to an error in judgment, and not to any inherent love of cruelty. We must not forget too, that our policy in regard to Ireland has been precisely the same as that which Russia has adopted in regard to Poland. We acquired possession of Ireland, as the Russians did of Poland, by taking advantage of party dissensions. The Irish, like the Poles, frequently rebelled ; after one of these rebellions we resolved to make them Englishmen and Protestants, as Russia seems equally resolved to make the Poles members of the Greek Church, and Russians ; but

the Irish clung to the language and the faith of their forefathers, and we drove them from house and home with the savage cry, "to Hell or Connaught," much in the same way as the Russians are now driving the Polish recusants to the wilds of Siberia. When our journalists abuse the Russians, they ought to bear in mind that our conduct in regard to Ireland renders it very easy for them to recriminate; this consideration would, perhaps, tend to moderate the acerbity of their language, and give them a more impartial view of the subject.

As an Englishman, I am naturally a friend of Poland, because I regard Russia as our greatest enemy, and am persuaded that nothing would diminish her power so much as the regeneration of that unhappy country. No one could have formed more ardent vows for the success of her gallant sons than I did during the late revolution, for I considered their cause to be identic with our own, and deeply did I regret that a British ministry should have suffered such a glorious opportunity of giving a death-blow to Russia, to have passed by unheeded, never, perhaps, to return. A revolution in Poland has, in fact, quite a different interest for us, than one in any other country, for the question is not whether this person or that shall be placed on the throne, or whether the government shall be monarchical, constitutional, or democratic, it is whether England shall retain or



shall abandon a strong barrier against Russian ambition, and Russian aggrandizement. Hence the most powerful of all motives, that of self-preservation, must naturally render every Englishman a friend to Polish independence.

But this motive, strong as it is, ought not to lead our judgment astray, if we take a higher view of the question, when divested of all national interests and prejudices. Considered in this light, we shall be obliged to confess that the Russians are perfectly justified in subjugating a people, who, if suffered to remain independent, would always be a dangerous neighbour, and with foreign assistance, might at any time shake their empire to its foundations, by placing them in the same perilous situation in which we should have been placed, had Hoche succeeded in landing his army in Ireland.

It must be allowed, too, that unity of language and unity of religion are of great advantage to a state, and worth purchasing at some risk. All history, in fact, shows that one of the greatest blessings which a state can enjoy, is unity of religion, no matter what the religion may be, and there can be no doubt but that such a state will always have an advantage over another, in which the clashing interests and dogmas of various sects too exclusively occupy public attention.\* If the at-

\* Hungary and England are peculiarly unfortunate in this respect. In the former we behold a Babel of languages, in the latter a Babel of religions. We have, at all events, with the exception

tempts to Protestantize Ireland after the Reformation had succeeded, there can be no doubt that all

of a little Welsh and Irish, unity of speech, but the Hungarians have both plagues at once.

Writers on Hungarian statistics differ considerably in their statements, the means of acquiring correct information being both difficult and limited. The *Tudományos Gyűjtemény* for April, 1822, states the population in 1820, at 8,720,519, to which must be added the population of the military frontiers 863,667, the army 100,000, and a district in Croatia, since united to the kingdom, 184,200, making a total of 9,868,386; but from a comparison of the different statements of Liechtenstern, Schwartzner, and Csaplovics, I should think that at present the population of Hungary, including the military frontiers, must exceed ten millions, and that of Transylvania not fall far short of two.

Taking the population of Hungary at ten millions, the Roman Catholics (including 700,000 united Greeks, and 100,000 united Armenians) will probably amount to five millions and a half—the members of the Greek Church to rather less than two millions—the Calvinists to a million and a half—the Lutherans to less than a million, and the Jews to about 170,000.

The five principal languages spoken, are Magyar, Shlovak or Slovak, Rumonic, German, and Latin—the two latter being learned as a general medium of communication, though Latin is not near so much spoken now as it was formerly. The Magyars—the conquerors—the Normans of the country, only amount to three millions and a half, while the Slovaks—the conquered—the Anglo-Saxons of the land—exceed four millions; but divided into several tribes, each speaking a different though cognate language—namely, Slovaks, by far the most numerous, Rusniacs, Vendians or Vandals, (only 42,000) Croatians, Slavonians, properly so called, Ruthenians, Raitzen, &c. The Wallachs of Hungary speaking the Rumonic language, are nearly a million; the Germans, scattered over the whole country, especially in the large towns, about 6 or 700,000.

the cruelties by which the forcible conversion of a people must necessarily be accompanied, would

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Besides these, there are Armenians, Greeks, Albanians (the so called Clementines), French, and Italians, (as colonists in the Banat), Jews (170,000) and Gypseys (30,000); so there is no lack either of languages or religions, and in Transylvania there are even more, the religious *disunion* being increased by the *Unitarians*.

The Hungarian patriots, in order to remedy this evil, are striving to make the Magyar language general, are attempting to force the majority (six millions and a half) to adopt the language of the minority (three millions and a half). It will be a fortunate thing if they can succeed, but I am afraid the obstacles are too numerous. This is one of those numerous instances which may be cited to show our want of political foresight. There are, perhaps, not a dozen persons in England who ever bestowed a thought on the kind of linguistic war, now carrying on in Hungary, perhaps not a hundred who have even heard of it, and yet its issue will be of much more importance to us than those who have not paid attention to the subject, or resided in that interesting country, would be apt to suppose; for if the Slavonians of Hungary can be brought to adopt the Magyar language, they will, with the language, also acquire the Magyar spirit of independence, and instead of being the friends of Russia, will become its greatest enemies. I make no doubt that the Russian agents in Hungary, who are very numerous, do all they can to counteract this patriotic plan of Magyarizing the country, and several satirical articles respecting it, in the German periodicals, may have been paid for out of the Czar's treasury. If we had agents there, it would consequently be their duty to encourage it; for singular as it may appear, it is nevertheless a fact, that if the Magyar language should become general in Hungary, the power of England will be increased, and that of Russia diminished. I mention this as one instance in a hundred, to show how apparent trifles may be turned to advantage by a government like that of Russia, who has its agents in every corner of the earth.

have been long since forgotten, and that Ireland would now have been in as flourishing a condition as England, and have formed in reality an integral part of the empire, instead of a discontented province requiring a numerous army to keep it in subjection. The peace and welfare of one generation would have been sacrificed to have insured those blessings to a hundred succeeding ones, who would readily have pardoned the cruelties committed on their ancestors if those cruelties had been the means of fully identifying them with their fellow citizens. Protestants of course strive to justify every attempt to convert the Irish, and Catholics as necessarily stigmatize such attempts; but the arguments of both parties being founded on sectarian views of the question, are without the least weight,—it is only when the judgment is perfectly free that its decisions can be relied on. Now, setting aside the respective merits of both religions as entirely foreign to the question, and *merely considering it in a political point of view*, I say, that as Protestantism was the religion of the majority, the governments of that period ought not to be blamed for striving to convert the Irish to the faith of that majority. I even think that such attempts are more deserving of praise than of censure, always supposing them to be undertaken from *motives of pure policy, without any admixture of religious bigotry*, which, however, in this instance, was unfortunately very far from being the case.

The first attempt to convert the Irish by compulsory measures may be palliated, and *if the motives had been of a more political nature*, might even be justified ; but to have followed up a fruitless system for so long a period, after it had become quite evident that there was not the remotest chance of it ever succeeding, has not only been the height of injustice, but has showed a great want of political foresight, accompanied by a blind spirit of sectarian bigotry.

Now if Russian statesmen be thoroughly convinced that the task of compelling the Poles to adopt their language and religion is one which only requires a little perseverance to accomplish (a conviction which I am, however, far from partaking), we ought not to blame them for making the attempt. Such attempts, however, are political experiments of too dangerous a nature to be often repeated, and ought never to be undertaken without mature deliberation and the greatest chance of success. If within a due period such a compulsory system should not prove successful, it ought to be abandoned, and one directly the reverse be adopted. The inhabitants of a conquered country, in a word, ought either to be disnationalized or conciliated—there is no medium. They must either be compelled to adopt the language, religion, laws, and institutions of the conquerors, in order that the posterity of both may form but one people, or they ~~must~~ be left in possession of these characteristics of

nationality and be made the confederates of the conquerors, who ought to strive, by a system of mutual concessions, to render the union as intimate as dissimilar nationalities will allow. Conquerors cannot be blamed for *first* trying the harsher system, as it is capable of producing a much greater good than the other, but it will require statesmen of no ordinary capacity to carry on such a system, and especially to judge when it ought to be abandoned and the milder one adopted. This is what our statesmen have failed in, they have kept up a system capable of producing good if successful within a limited period, far beyond the term which ought to have been assigned for its operation, the consequence has been that they have neither disnationalized nor conciliated the Irish, but only produced general misery and discontent, which now renders the one impossible and the other extremely difficult.

The experiment which Russia is now making in Poland has, however, much greater chances of success than those which have proved so fruitless to us—the languages and religions of the two countries being more analogous than those of England and Ireland. The Irish and English languages belong to two different families; the Irish to the Celtic, the English to the Teutonic—families which have little or no analogy, whereas both Russian and Polish belong to the same Slavonic family, and are as nearly allied as High and Low German or Italian and

Spanish. The difference between the Greek and the Roman Catholic Church is also much less than between the latter and the Church of England. The attempt has, therefore, more chances of success than ours had, and I am afraid will eventually succeed, except the Poles meet with that assistance which England, if she has the least regard for her own interests, ought to render them ere it be too late.

This abuse of Russia ought to cease, it has too long been the fashion to decry nations whose interests happen to clash with our own. We are very apt, too, to fall into the same error as the French, and to imagine that all nations who do not enjoy the numerous blessings of our free constitution are slaves, and slaves will remain until they be governed by King, Lords, and Commons in Parliament assembled. Now our form of Government may be, and no doubt is, a very good form of Government for England, but to introduce any thing of the kind into a country like Russia would be the height of folly, and if a Russian Emperor were ever to propose such a thing, all true Russian patriots ought instantly to remove him from the throne to a lunatic asylum. What Russia requires now, and will require for years to come, is not liberty according to our acceptation of the word, but a strong autocratic government, capable of harmonizing the discordant elements of her population, and directing their united energies to the

accomplishment of a vast design—the design of rendering Russia the first power on earth, both by land and sea. This design was first conceived by the master-mind of Peter the Great, when he transformed his Asiatic Empire into a European one, by connecting it with the Baltic and Black Sea, and the vast plan which he then chalked out has been filled up by his successors with admirable skill and perseverance, especially by Catherine, Alexander, and the present enlightened monarch. If we take a rapid survey of the Russian Empire we shall find that the greater part of this design has been accomplished and a treble power acquired to realise the rest. Russia has now an uninterrupted dominion from the shores of the Baltic to the British possessions in America, from the Frozen Ocean to the frontiers of the Chinese Empire and the States of Central Asia—an immense extent of contiguous territory, peopled by 60 millions of inhabitants, 50 millions of whom belong to the same Slavonic race, and may in time become as homogeneous a people as the French or English.\* This conti-

\* Writers who attempt to prove that Russia is weak on account of the heterogeneity of her population, cannot certainly have paid due attention to the subject. In the preceding note I have shewn the weakness of Hungary in this respect—the Magyars, the real Hungarians, being in a considerable minority, their population being to that of the others as 7 to 13. Now supposing the whole Russian Empire to contain 60 millions of inhabitants, it will be found that 50 millions of them are Slavonians ; but among these there are even



guity of territory is also a great advantage which Russia has over us. Her conquests have proceeded from a centre, and have been carried on in unbroken lines over one-third of the globe; ours on the contrary have proceeded from different points, and are consequently scattered over every part of its surface. Russian conquests appear as the natural developement of a great people, whose innate energies have been gradually expanded by the vivifying force of presiding intellect, while our conquests and colonies seem owing to mere chance,—which in fact they really are,—and appear as so many planets hurled, in a convulsion of nature, from a central sun, some of them at distances which require their parent luminary to shine with undiminished splendour to retain them within the sphere of her attraction.

Russia has thus extended her empire by a series of well-concerted and well-executed plans. She has secured it on the west by transforming Poland into a province, and is now occupied in Russianizing that province as fast as she possibly can, in spite of the protestations and remonstrances of foreign powers, which she feels herself strong

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42 millions of Russians, speaking different dialects it is true, but which differ no more than those of Yorkshire and Lancashire from pure English. Consequently the Slavonic population is to the Non-Slavonic as 5 to 1, and even the pure Russian to all the rest as 7 to 3.

enough to disregard. She has fortified her Asiatic frontiers, has taken the Kirghis horde (in 1829) under her protection, and thus opened for her commerce a secure road to Bokhara and the Central States of Asia, over which her influence is predominant. Her future policy will consequently be principally directed towards Turkey, for it is only by acquiring possession of that country that she can become as powerful by sea as she is now by land, and we may rest assured that no means will be spared by her statesmen to acquire possession, not only of Turkey, both European and Asiatic, but also of all the countries situated between the Black Sea and Adriatic; for their plans will only then be accomplished when the western frontier of their empire shall extend in as straight a line as possible from the mouth of the Vistula to the mountains of Friuli, and from thence only have the sea for a boundary to the southernmost point of Greece. The Russian Empire will then have acquired its "*natural limits*."

I am aware that in order to do this they will have numerous difficulties to surmount, but they have already surmounted so many, owing in a great measure it is true, to the supineness or connivance of those Powers who ought to have stopped them in their career of victory and conquest, that they will probably in the end also surmount these, except those Powers should be at length aroused to a sense of their common danger. In respect

to the countries that fall within this frontier line ; Prussia would be glad to cede her portion for a compensation elsewhere. Hanover for instance. Wallachia and Moldavia are already semi-Russian provinces, and Servia and Greece are completely under her influence ; Turkey unassisted could make no serious resistance, and the Austrian territories which this frontier line would embrace, namely, Galicia, Hungary, Transylvania, and the territories along the Adriatic, are chiefly peopled with different tribes of the Slavonic race, who in general would prefer being under Russia, as the idea of uniting all the Slavonians into one great people would flatter their national vanity ; besides, Italy would offer a rich fund to compensate Austria, in case her rulers should get entangled in the meshes of Russian diplomacy. The greatest resistance which Russia would encounter, would be from the Magyars, than whom a more brave, hospitable, generous, noble-minded, high-spirited people does not exist on the face of the earth, they detest the Russians, and despise the Slavonic tribes of Hungary, the Shlowaks, Rusniaks, &c. conquered by their rude ancestors ; it is well known how they sympathised with the Poles during the late Revolution, and what numerous addresses were sent to the Emperor in their favour. They, I am sure, would be glad to shed the last drop of their blood to maintain their cherished independence, but their courage would avail them not,

even though a Hunyad were to arise, and lead them on again to deeds of glory ; the storm would be far too mighty to resist, it would sweep over the land like the fiery simoom of the desert, and leave nought save desolation behind. This gallant people seem destined, in the 19th century, to form the last barrier of Teutonic Europe against the Russians, as they formed that of Christian Europe against the Ottomans, in the 16th. Those Powers, whose interest and duty it was to have assisted them at that period, neglected to do so, and the fatal battle of Mohacs opened Solyman the way to Vienna. Let us hope that in our days it will be otherwise, and that the noble and gallant Magyars may form the vanguard of an Austrian army, which, assisted by the powerful support of Great Britain, may put an end for ever to Russian aggrandisement.

If something of this kind be not done, if England still continue to protest and remonstrate, without daring to act, I firmly believe that the inevitable progress of Russian Power will be such as I have indicated. I regard this progress as the natural developement of her political existence, as a necessity inherent in her condition, as a phenomenon of the same nature as that of the growth of a human being from infancy to manhood.

The Slavonic race\* seems predestined to effect

\* I use the word race in an ethnographical, and not in a physical signification ; physically speaking there are but 5 races : the West

as great changes in the world, as the Greco-Italic and Teutonic races have effected. From the high lands of Central Asia, races of men seem to have been propelled like waves one after another, from the remotest ages comparatively speaking down to the present time. The earliest traces we have of these emigrations in Europe, is that of the Finns and Celts, who at a very remote period appear to have occupied pretty nearly the whole of it. The Finns being in possession of the northern and eastern, and the Celts of the western and southern part. They were followed by a race which has been severally denominated the Thracian, Greco-Italic, and Romanic. The mixture of this race with a tribe, in all probability of Semitic origin, produced the Greeks, and with various Celtic tribes, probably also with some whose emigration in Europe is of a still earlier date, the Latins, Sabines, Samnites, &c. The career of this race was truly glorious, and is recorded in imperishable characters in the pages of history;

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Asiatic, improperly called the Caucasian; the East Asiatic, as improperly called the Mogol; the Oceanic, or Malay; the African, and the American; but if we use the word race as I do, ethnographically, there will be 42 races in Europe and Asia alone, not to mention the numerous ones in Africa and America, whose languages are not sufficiently studied to admit of classification, though often attempted. See on the subject, Klaproth's *Asia Polyglotta*, and Balbi's *Atlas Ethnographique du Globe*, though the latter is a mere compilation, and often very erroneous.

the Greeks and Romans, its two noblest tribes, have filled the world with their renown, but the laws of nature were not changed even for them, they followed the natural progress of society, from barbarism to civilization, refinement and decay, the conquests of the Romans engendering wealth and luxury, and rendering them an easy prey to the hardy sons of the North, the uncorrupted Teutons, who at a much earlier period had replaced the Celts and Finns in the present countries of Germany and Scandinavia. The fusion of these two races gave rise, as is well known, to most of the modern nations of Europe. The Germans, Dutch, Danes, and Swedes, may be said to be of the pure Teutonic race, and we form a transition to the Teuto-Romanic, which comprises the Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, French, Rhetians (in the Grisons), and Wallachians.\*

The career of the Teutonic race has been and still continues to be very brilliant. The Italians have excelled in the fine arts, and have alone produced a Raphael and a Michael Angelo; the Germans have explored the depths of science, and have proved themselves to be the most intel-

\* The best proof that the Wallachians are the descendants of a Roman colony, is their language, which is a corrupted Latin, with a slight admixture of Slavonic, Turkish, Greek, &c. There are two principal idioms, the Daco-Rumonic, spoken by the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Wallachians of Hungary; and the Thraco-Rumonic, or Kutzo-Wallachian, spoken in Bulgaria, and which is not near so pure as the former.

lectual people at present in existence, while we have long been pre-eminent in the practical affairs of life and have carried the useful arts to the highest degree of perfection. But will not this career also have an end? Will not German philosophy degenerate into Greek sophistry, and British refinement into Roman luxury? When this shall happen the destinies of the Teutonic race will be accomplished, and it will require to be invigorated by the fusion with a hardier and less corrupted people. The Slavonians seem to be held in reserve for this purpose; they are very far from being barbarous it is true, still they are infinitely less advanced in refinement and corruption than the modern Teutonic and Teuto-Romanic nations. This fusion will give rise to a Slavo-Teutonic race, whose career will probably be of shorter duration than that of the Teuto-Romanic, owing to the Slavonians being in a more advanced state of civilization than the Germanic tribes of the fifth century. Still it will, no doubt, be brilliant; for the fusion of two different races, however corrupt they may be, invariably gives rise to a mixed race, infinitely superior to either of them in every quality, both physical and moral,—and this is an admirable dispensation of Providence, for even supposing all mankind to be one day sunk in luxury and corruption it would not be necessary, in order to renew the human race, that it should first be destroyed, a century of war would answer the

purpose as effectually; the different races would be mingled, and mankind completely regenerated. The Slavo-Teutonic race after centuries of vigour will also be doomed to decay, and will be invigorated in its turn by some fresh horde of Asiatic barbarians. Judging the future from the past, this seems to be the natural course of events, and if it should be so, the increasing power of Russia is a sign that the Teutonic race has already attained its point of culmination.

These, I am aware, are mere speculative opinions and ought not to have the least weight with a statesman, for if it could even be proved that Russia is predestined to perform such a part in the dramatic history of the world, that ought not to prevent a British minister from counteracting her designs. Whether her progress be better for mankind in general, or for this and that nation in particular has nothing to do with the question; the only question which he will have to consider is, whether that progress be detrimental to British interests, and if so, he ought to oppose it by every means in his power, and be ready when these interests are at stake to brave even fate itself, convinced though he be that its decrees are irresistible. Now, I believe, every one will allow (except perhaps a few of the ultra-isolators) that every inch of territory which Russia may in future acquire, every vessel which she may add to her already numerous fleet, every diplomatic intrigue which may increase her



influence over surrounding nations will be highly detrimental to these interests, and so many blows struck at British power, British liberty, and British independence.

It has indeed long been evident to every one who has paid the least attention to the subject that henceforth the first duty of a British statesman will be to counteract the designs of Russia, the only difference of opinion is respecting the best way of counteracting these designs, and an alliance with France has been much boasted of as the only effectual remedy to be employed. Now my firm conviction is, that not the least dependance can be placed on France, for although it may be against her interests to suffer Russia to gain possession of Turkey, (a point which, however, is very questionable,) it would be equally against her interests to assist England in crushing that power. An ambitious French monarch would prefer allowing the Czar to extend his dominions to *their natural limits*, provided he would allow him to do the same in regard to France, the *natural limits* of both countries to be defined of course according to circumstances. Napoleon traced the *natural limits* of France from Hamburg to Rome, and two ambitious Sovereigns in France and Russia might extend the *natural limits* of their respective countries east and west until they should meet in the centre of Germany. The interests of France are too diametrically opposed to those of England, and too susceptible of

coalescing with those of Russia by means of a few mutual concessions, for a British minister to place the least confidence in the professions and promises of Louis Philippe. The policy of this wily monarch is to preserve peace at any price, and to make himself the arbitrator of any quarrel which may take place between us and Russia, and this, if not a true system of policy for France, is at all events, a true system for the Orlean dynasty, to whom any war would be fatal.

If, then, no confidence can be placed in France ; if, in case of war, we are more likely to have France for an enemy than for an ally, if, as I have attempted to show, it would be even better to have her for an enemy, where are we to seek for our allies ? I answer, that on the one hand we ought to form the closest alliance with Spain and Portugal, which will enable us to keep France in check ; and on the other hand, with the German and Scandinavian States : which alliances will serve us equally against France and Russia. With Turkey, and the States of Central Asia, we ought to form more than an alliance—we ought to take them under our protection. These are the only alliances we can form which can be grounded on mutual interests, and therefore the only durable ones. Spain has more to fear from France than from us, and to this is joined a national prejudice which the Spaniards have against the French ; a prejudice which will always work in our favour,

and which it will always be well to keep up. The interests of the German states, and especially of Austria, are diametrically opposed both to those of France and Russia; and as the Germans can never become a maritime people, they are our most natural allies. We have nothing to fear from them, they have nothing to fear from us; whereas both we and they have every thing to fear from France as well as from Russia. Our present system of policy is directly the reverse of this, and we are alienating them by cultivating the friendship of their bitterest enemies, merely because their form of government is said to be similar to our own, although in spirit they differ as much as light from darkness. In forming alliances, it is, however, the most absurd thing in the world to pay the least attention to forms of government. Principles and forms of government ought not to have the least weight in questions of such vital importance. If it were for our interest we ought to form an alliance with a Nero in one country, and with the most licentious Democracy that ever existed in another. Our alliances, in a word, ought to be founded on mutual interests, independent of all forms of government. Hence, as long as the world remains constituted as it is at present, whatever form or forms of government may exist in Germany, the Germans will always remain our most natural allies. And although the interests of some of the German States may at times be opposed, as those

of Prussia and Austria for instance, still we may rest assured that English influence, properly directed, and divested of all party feeling and propaganda, would always be powerful enough to neutralise the elements of discord, and direct the united energies of the whole Teutonic race.

But supposing us returned to our natural line of policy ; supposing Spain to be pacified, and either Christina or Carlos quietly seated on the throne, (no matter which, provided it put an end to anarchy, be favourable to our interests, and be done without French intervention) ; supposing us further at the head of a kind of Teutonic league in Germany ; still a great deal would have to be done : for if these measures should produce a war, it would be a long and bloody one, and require great exertion both on our part and on that of our allies, and the issue after all be very doubtful.

I will not here enter into the abstract question, whether war be justifiable or not. It is a question on which a deal might be said, but foreign to my purpose. I will merely observe, that from the earliest periods on record down to the present time, nations appear to have been compelled by an unavoidable necessity to decide their quarrels by the force of arms, and will in all probability always be compelled to do so. That war is a temporary evil, I will allow ; so is the hurricane which sweeps over the deep, and destroys, with unrelenting fury,

“ Alike the Armada’s pride and spoils of Trafalgar ; ”

so is the earthquake, which convulses all nature, and engulfs a whole population in a common tomb; so is the volcano, which lays cities under ashes or inundates their streets with torrents of burning lava. All these are evils, but evils which must necessarily produce a greater good, otherwise they would not have formed part of the great scheme of the universe. It is the same with war: a whole kingdom is ravaged by it, and thousands are plunged in misery and wretchedness, but it also prevents nations from falling into that deadly lethargic slumber which paralyses all their faculties, both physical and moral, and gives rise to evils ten thousand times greater than any which ever resulted from the most protracted war. If a statesman should deem a war necessary to support the dignity and interests of his country, he ought not to be prevented from undertaking it by any pretended feelings of humanity. The interest of his country is the only question he will have to attend to; he can leave the rest to be settled by pious divines or soi-disant philanthropists.

Although the duties of a British Minister would be very arduous in case of war, I have not the least hesitation in saying, that they will be ten times more arduous if peace should be preserved. We must bear in mind that no country will profit by peace so much as Russia: by its means she will not only extend her commercial relations, but she will also increase her navy, and pay more attention

to the construction of her ships and the discipline and capacity of her officers and sailors. This, however, will be nothing to what her diplomacy will effect. Her foreign department, which is so admirably organised, will fill every country with its secret or avowed agents, who will gradually prepare the minds of men for a great change, to be wrought by Russian power and Russian influence.

It is evident that no statesman ought to plunge his country in a war without having a well grounded hope that it would terminate successfully, and as the success of a war against Russia and France would be very doubtful, even though we should be assisted by all our natural Allies, no English Minister ought to be blamed for wishing to preserve peace. Let peace then be preserved, it will be better for us than war, we can diminish the power of Russia as effectually, and with much less risk, provided we adopt a true system of policy, and set every diplomatic spring in action, in order to counteract the deep laid and well matured plans of a wily and powerful rival. But this is a field of action in which Russia will have a great advantage over us. The Russians in fact are as much superior to us in diplomatic skill, as we are superior to them in naval tactics. This is owing to various causes, the principal one is the excellent manner in which their department for Foreign Affairs is conducted ; beside their Consuls, who are appointed more in a diplomatic point of view than a com-

mercial one, they have numerous secret agents in every part of the globe, men who make themselves acquainted with the language, manners, and customs of the country in which they reside, and who mix with all classes from the noble to the labourer; for they have their agents who figure in the drawing-rooms of the great, and who are generally noblemen of broken fortunes, and others who mix more with the middle classes, and others again whose sphere of action is confined to the lower orders. If it were not invidious, I could name several of these agents whom I have had pointed out to me in Paris, Vienna, Copenhagen, Naples, and several other capitals, and who appeared men of talent, highly capable of performing the duties of their office.

I know that in England we are in the habit of sneering at such an office, and stigmatizing such persons as spies, which is to say the least very foolish—for what can be more honourable, or praiseworthy than to procure by all fair and legitimate means, information which may be of advantage to one's country. There are no doubt Russian agents who deserve the name of spies, in the worst sense of the word, but I only speak of the respectable class, which is sufficiently numerous.

It is well known how deficient we are in this respect, we have, it is true, some very good ambassadors, men of as great talent and capacity as are to be met with in any country, but it is not ambassadors who always render the greatest service to a

state, it is more frequently the inferior agents who associate more with the people, and who consequently ought to be more intimately acquainted with their political opinions and projects. Now this class of agents can scarcely be said to exist with us, for independent of a few travelling gentlemen, who are now and then charged with a mission, we have only our Consuls who are officially required to furnish Government with information, but as English Consuls are generally appointed solely for the protection of trade, the information they furnish, must necessarily be more of a commercial than a political nature. I believe indeed, that except in rare cases, this is the only information required of them, and in fact there are many who would be incapable of giving any other; for to furnish correct political information respecting a country, it is not only necessary to reside in that country, but also to become thoroughly acquainted with its language, history, laws, and institutions, together with the manners and customs of its inhabitants. Now although many of our Consuls possess this kind of knowledge, and that too in a high degree; still I am afraid that the greater number would be found wanting, in fact such kind of knowledge is not required of them, they are only required to send information respecting the commerce of the country in which they reside, a task which is far less difficult.

But if Russia has a great advantage over us in



her means of acquiring information and extending her secret influence, her form of Government gives her a still greater advantage; for I believe it is universally allowed that Constitutional Governments, though more favourable to individual liberty, have not that unity of action which is to be found in absolute Monarchies or pure Aristocracies. The contrast between Russia and England in this respect cannot be greater. In Russia all power emanates from the Czar, who is supposed to have received his from God, to whom alone he is accountable. He appoints the members of the Four Colleges, or Councils, which form the Central Government of the Empire. These are the Council of State, the Directing Senate, the Holy Directing Synod, and the Ministry of State, a section of which is the Department of Foreign Affairs. The members of these different bodies are in general men of the greatest talent and capacity. Whatever they, in their respective departments may decide on, and the Czar approve, is instantly put in execution, without the least delay or opposition; for the inhabitants of Russia are now in that—shall I call it—happy period of social development, when men believe that all power is of divine origin, and must be implicitly obeyed—a state of society admirably adapted for a growing power, whose rulers have acquired all the knowledge and experience which the most advanced civilization can afford. There are, I am well aware, numbers of individuals to be

found among the higher and middle classes in Russia who are equally as enlightened as their rulers, but these men, at least those among them who are sufficiently enlightened to comprehend the true interests of their country; these men, I say, will obey the mandates of their Czar, though they know him to be a fallible being like themselves, as implicitly as the serf, who believes him to be God's vicegerent on earth. They will do this, not through fear of the knout, as foreigners ignorantly pretend, but from motives of true patriotism, ay, I hesitate not to say it, however strange it may sound to English ears, of as pure a patriotism as ever animated a Sydney or a Russell. For these men, however they may admire a Constitutional form of Government—however they may desire, both from public and private motives, to see that form introduced into Russia, must be perfectly aware that for the present, and for years to come, an Autocratical Government is the only one adapted to the state of her population, the extent of her empire, and the accomplishment of her destinies.

I have no occasion to point out the striking contrast between England and Russia in this respect. Our social condition is, indeed, very different from that of Russia. We have a hundred different religions, each held up by its votaries as the only true one, and a score of political parties, each of which pretends to possess exclusively the art of good government. Now, the natural consequence of this

state of society is, that the government of the country is subject to frequent changes: Tories succeed Whigs, and Whigs Tories, and each change is accompanied by a corresponding change in our Foreign Policy. One party wishes to assist Christina, another Carlos, and a third, neither of them. This set of men, if they come into office, would neglect our home affairs and turn all their attention to our Foreign Policy: their rivals would do just the reverse. No party too can make sure of remaining in office for any considerable length of time, for half a century, for instance, which is but a short period in the life of a nation. Now, when men enter office with this uncertainty, and when their attention too is almost exclusively occupied in combatting a rival party, striving to oust them out,—how is it possible for them to form any deep-laid well-concerted plan, and to pursue that plan unremittingly from age to age, as the Roman Senate did of old, and the Russian Czars are doing in our days? It is, in fact, utterly impossible, and as long as we retain our present system of government, Russia will always have a great advantage over us.

But my readers will indignantly exclaim—"Do you wish to introduce Russian despotism into England? Do you wish us to become serfs, and blindly obey the will of an Autocrat?" I answer, by no means. I have too great a love for my father-land to propose any such thing. Although I have re-

sided too long in foreign countries to be as enthusiastic an admirer of our Constitution as those among my countrymen who have never quitted their native shores, still I do admire that Constitution, and I am firmly convinced that it is the only form of government adapted for our present social condition. I would not change an iota of it: I would leave King, Lords and Commons in the possession of all their rights, and except the reform of real and acknowledged abuses, I should be a decided enemy to innovation. I would only propose an alteration in the manner of conducting the Foreign Department of the Executive; an alteration which would leave us in the full enjoyment of a Constitutional Government as heretofore, and would, at the same time, give our Foreign Policy all that unity of action and plan which seems to be the peculiar privilege of absolute Monarchies, or pure Aristocracies.

Now, in order to effect this, I would propose that our Foreign Affairs be entirely under the direction of a Council of Statesmen, something in the same way as our naval affairs are under that of a Council of Admirals. I would establish, in short, a Board or Council, whose members should, like the judges, be conditionally appointed for life, and be selected from the most experienced and most talented men of all parties, without distinction. This Council should have the exclusive direction of our Foreign Policy, in the most extensive signifi-

tion of the term, that is to say, of our relations with foreign countries, of our Colonies, and in a great measure also of our trade and commerce, whose interests in fact are too identified with our Foreign Policy to be well separated from it. Its members should not be numerous (thirteen, including a president, would I think be quite sufficient), and its acts of course subject to the control of Parliament, precisely in the same way as those of the present Foreign Secretary. For this purpose, one of its members should sit in the House of Lords and another in the House of Commons; they should have no vote, and only be permitted to answer questions or to take part in debates on Foreign and Colonial affairs. The other members of the Council should not be allowed to sit in Parliament. Lords, being members, might be allowed to take their seat in the House, as they would not willingly renounce that privilege, but they should not be permitted either to speak or vote; on the other hand, the Presidency of this Council should be made the highest office in the state, as in fact it would be the most important. These, however, are points of minor importance, which might easily be settled, provided the main feature of the plan be found feasible and expedient. The grand object would be to create a council of intelligent and experienced statesmen, whose duration in office and manner of appointment would be a sufficient guarantee that our Foreign Policy would in future be conducted with a unity of

plan and design totally independent of party politics, and which at the same time should not in the least endanger any of the fundamental principles of our Constitution.

It is my firm belief, that if some such plan as this were adopted, it would be a death-blow to the power of Russia ; her hopes of future aggrandizement are not founded so much on the bravery or discipline of her army and the progressive developement of her navy, as on the skill of her statesmen and diplomatists ; and I am persuaded that the Czar would sooner prefer reading a vote of the House of Commons for the equipment of twenty sail of the line, than one for the establishment of such a Council. We are now arrived at such a pitch of greatness, our empire is so vast and composed of such heterogeneous materials, our relations with foreign powers of such a multifarious and complicated nature, that the task of Foreign Secretary is too great for any one man, especially if his time be taken up, and his mind occupied with party dissensions, which is the case under the present system. And I must add, that to keep things merely in *statu quo*, will not be sufficient. We cannot stop in our career when and where we will, we must either go on or suffer our rivals to distance us. An English minister ought never to forget that the map of the British Empire is the map of the world, and that if the ministers of other countries have only to study surrounding nations, he has to know the wants and

interests of every people under the sun, from the savage Caffres of the Cape, to the civilized inhabitants of France and Germany.

If we reflect on these things, I think that the necessity for establishing such a Council becomes quite evident. But there is another institution whose necessity is still more evident—that of a Diplomatic College. If in fact a Council of the kind proposed should ever be created, its first duty would be to demand, by its orators in Parliament, the foundation of such a college, for as this Council would have the exclusive right of appointing ambassadors, consuls, diplomatic agents, &c., its first duty would be to render a sufficient number of persons capable of filling such important offices.

Embassies, as society is at present constituted, must necessarily be given to men of rank and property; but secretaries of legation, attachés, consuls, and diplomatic agents, ought to be brought up to their office by a regular and uniform system of education, specially adapted to the purpose. We expend a deal of money on a military college, merely to teach young men how to command a company or manœuvre a regiment, and have not as yet even bestowed a thought on the education of those whose office requires ten times more knowledge and instruction. In this college ought to be taught all sciences which are deemed requisite for a diplomatist, such as history, geography, statistics, law of nations, &c.; above all, languages. It

ought to have professors of every civilised language spoken on the face of the earth, and especially of the languages of countries bordering on Russia.\* The students and candidates for office ought moreover to undergo the strictest examination.

Now, supposing that we had only one hundred enterprising young men thus educated, each of them master of two or three of the languages indicated in the note; is it not evident that the

\* Besides the more familiar languages of Europe, such as French, Italian, German, &c., particular attention ought to be paid in this college to the study of the Slavonic languages, especially Russian, Serbian, Polish, Slovak, Lithauiic and Lettic, to those of the Turkish (improperly termed Tartar) family, especially the three possessing a literature, namely Ooigoor, Osmanlee, and Tscha-ketian; to those of the Caucasian region and of Central Asia; and lastly, to Rumonic and Magyar: the latter will be found very difficult, as it is quite an original language, having no analogy with any other except with those of the Uralian or Finnic family; and even the affinity with these is remote, though Gyarmathi, in his work entitled "*Affinitas linguæ Hungaricæ cum linguis Finnicæ origines grammaticæ demonstrata*, Gottingæ, 1799," attempts to prove the contrary:—however, he attempts too much; he only proves that some affinity does certainly exist, and nothing more. The Magyars, however, in the true spirit of Hungarian independence, spurn at the very idea of relationship with the Finns and Laplanders. "What!" said an Hungarian friend of mine, with whom I was disputing on the subject, and who gave his mustachios another twist at each fresh proof which I alleged from Gyarmathi;—"what! the Magyars—one of the finest-looking people in the world—related to the diminutive Laplanders? It is ridiculous; Gyarmathi must have been a German: no real Magyar would have offered us such an insult: never mention the subject again, I beg."



service which they would be able to render their country would be ten times greater than that which can be expected from the present government agents? In fact, the establishment of something of this kind is so self-evident, that I only wonder it has never been proposed before. It appears to be one of those things which only require mentioning to be instantly adopted. Such a College would even be of great service under the present system, and doubly so if our foreign affairs were conducted by a Council.

It would be presumptuous in me to indicate the precise line of policy which such a Council as the one proposed ought to follow. Any rules which might be laid down on this head would be subject to great modifications according to time and circumstances, of the expediency of which those in office would be the most capable of judging. The whole system of a Foreign Policy, founded on the real interests of this country, may, however, be summed up in a few words:—Diminish the power of France and Russia, increase that of the German States, especially of Austria, and place Turkey and the nations of Central Asia under British protection. This ought to be the scope of every British statesman; and if it were once adopted as the fundamental principle of our Foreign Policy, and acted upon without intermission, our exertions would soon be crowned with success. A war, which under the present system is even now necessary, and will in a short time become inevitable,

if we wish to preserve the least influence over Central Asia, can only be avoided with advantage by adopting such a plan, and leaving its execution to a body of men placed above the influence of parties or factions, and having under their direction numerous agents properly qualified for the duties of their important office. Instead of a maritime war, we should thus enter into a diplomatic one, and combat Russia with her own weapons; and though she has hitherto used these weapons with consummate skill, we should in the end acquire the pre-eminence. By pursuing such a plan we should not only weaken her power and increase our own, but should also open fresh routes for our commerce, and connect the scattered fragments of our vast Empire by means of our ascendancy over the intermediate nations. If, while thus acquiring power and consideration abroad, we should be so fortunate as to settle our disputes at home, then indeed we should truly be a great and glorious people, worthy of the most brilliant destinies ever decreed by Fate. God grant that these disputes may be settled, and that an epoch of civil convulsion may never have to be recorded in the annals of my country. May her tutelary Genius guide her in safety through the storms of faction. May the star of Great Britain still continue to shine refulgent above the horizon, nor sink down to rest until, for ages to come, it shall have dazzled succeeding generations with its splendour.

## A FEW ADDITIONAL REMARKS.

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It is far from my intention to reply to every observation which has been made on the first edition of this pamphlet, in the newspapers and periodicals. I respect the opinions of all parties when they are sincere. Opinions in fact depend on education, social position and a hundred other circumstances, and vary with the causes of which they are the effects, insomuch so that a man may be a sincere Republican at twenty, and a sincere Conservative at forty, without having abandoned his principles—that is to say, his opinions may have been modified by age and experience, while his principles of moral and political rectitude have remained invariably the same. I shall never quarrel with a man, nor esteem him a whit the less, because his political or religious opinions happen to differ from mine. I shall merely conclude that he has been placed in different circumstances than I have, and that if I had been similarly situated I should have acquired the same way of thinking. I shall only complain when a writer, for instance, quotes a long passage, p. 34—39,\* in order to condemn me as a speculatist, when I myself say, p. 39, that this passage contains “mere speculative opinions which ought not to

\* See the Monthly Review for September.

have the least weight with a statesman," which two lines are adroitly skipped over so as to make it appear as if my arguments were exclusively founded on such speculative notions and not on facts, whereas the contrary is the case, they being founded on the stubborn facts of Russian aggrandizement and French duplicity. I recommended an alliance with the Germans, not because they belong to the Teutonic race—I never intended to have said any thing so foolish—but for two cogent reasons, the truth of which cannot be called in question; first, because they can never become a maritime people; and secondly, because they have equally as much to fear both from France and Russia as we have, and are consequently like ourselves, the natural enemies of those Powers, and our natural allies. As to the speculative opinions in question, I declare them myself to be unworthy the notice of a practical statesman, who in fact ought to disregard speculative opinions of any kind; in a philosophical point of view they may perhaps be more worthy of consideration, and may be found by those capable of appreciating them, to be neither "wild" nor "intangible," for they are derived from history, which is palpable enough, and from ethnographic affinities, which are of much greater importance than writers who have not paid due attention to the subject are apt to suppose.

There is one charge, however, which I cannot suffer to remain unnoticed. I am accused of Mac-

chiavellism, of "the most unblushing Macchiavellism ever avowed."\* Now Macchiavellism is a very vague term, which admits of several definitions; if it be employed to designate a system of policy which rejects no means however vile and infamous to attain its ends, of such a system as that pursued by a Philip II. or a Borgia; I reply, that I utterly abhor and detest such an abominable system, and defy any one to find the least trace of it in these pages. But if this term be used to indicate the policy of a statesman who only attends to national interests, striving to forward them by all fair and legitimate means, without caring whether the measures which he adopts for that end be detrimental or not to other countries, provided they tend to increase the welfare or maintain the dignity of his own; in that case I must plead guilty to the charge, for I am so deeply imbued with this kind of Macchiavellism as to imagine that it would be of far greater service to the country than all the sentimental twaddle and philanthropic nonsense now so much in vogue. When the Greek mania was raging in Europe, a daily mess of this kind of trash was dished up for the public, who swallowed it with the characteristic voracity of a newspaper reading people. And what has it produced? Let the declaimers against Macchiavellism answer; they will be obliged to confess that in this instance, at least, their philanthropy, christianity, and so forth,

\* Monthly Review for September.

has not been of any very great advantage either to their own country or to the one which it was intended to serve, whereas the system against which they declaim would probably have benefitted both.

In this age of cant it has become the fashion to talk of universal philanthropy, perpetual peace, "a Christian recognition of equality of rights between nations," and a many other fine things of the same kind. Now such a philanthropic system is like free trade, it might possibly answer well enough if all nations simultaneously adopted it; but if only one powerful people obstinately persisted in following the old system of national self-interest, what would become of the philanthropists? It is true the most edifying dispatches would be indited in the Foreign Office, and speeches delivered in Parliament, worthy to have been pronounced in ages of fabled innocence; but it would unfortunately happen that while we were thus philanthropizing and sentimentalizing, Russia would be pursuing the real Macchiavellic policy of attending exclusively to her own interests. We have, therefore, only two choices left, we must either persuade the Russians to adopt our own sentimental twaddle, or, we must adopt their system of Roman policy; and as I presumed that the latter would be somewhat less difficult to effect than the former, I ventured to recommend its adoption at the risk of incurring the imputation of Macchiavellism, which

if the term be understood in its proper ~~signification~~, I shall bear with a quiet conscience, it being in this sense synonymous with true patriotism. To be a true patriot is all that I desire, I have not the least ambition ever to become a *philanthropist*.

The advice given in p. 9, to prevent a rival power from acquiring maritime greatness by nipping the germs of that greatness when in the bud, appears to have shocked the nerves of certain persons, whose extreme delicacy of feeling, no doubt renders them exquisitely sensitive to every thing which does not appear at first view to be grounded on principles of the strictest morality. To these persons I put the simple question. Do you, or do you not admit that England ought to retain a decided superiority at sea over every other country? If you do not admit it, I have nothing to say, you may condemn my maxims as immoral or Macchiavellic, or apply to them any other opprobrious term which you may think proper—neither will I argue the point with you—for your arguments would be of the same stamp as those brought forward to prove that we ought to abandon Gibraltar, because the Swiss calico-printers are able to sell their goods cheaper in that fortress—notwithstanding its formidable batteries and redoubts—than our own Manchester manufacturers!!\* Only to think of the folly of keeping

\* See "A cure"—an innocent homœopathic cure—"for Russophobia, by a Manchester Manufacturer," p. 37.

up a fortress, which can be taken by a Calico-printer!!! It is a decided case for the Economists, and I hope the Hon. Member for Middlesex will bestow "deep attention" on it during the next session. But if you do admit that we ought to keep up our naval superiority at any price—and I trust there are few Englishmen who will not admit it—you will also be obliged to admit that if a rival power begins to increase her fleet, and goes on increasing it, the day must inevitably arrive when this superiority can only be maintained by an expensive and bloody war, and you must finally admit that it would be a more prudent and a less egotistical policy to prevent the germs of this greatness from ripening into maturity, by nipping them in the bud and thus save your descendants from the risk of a war, which by a thousand accidents might end unfavourably, and render England the mere appendage of a Continental empire. It has indeed been said that we have no right to prevent other nations from increasing their fleet, and that we ought only to counteract such measures by increasing our own. But I have attempted to shew, p. 10, that we have such a right—the expediency of acting upon it is another thing, and it may sometimes be better to adopt a less hardy policy, and add a few vessels to our navy; but the right will exist from the moment in which our political existence is placed in jeopardy, whether we choose to act upon



it or not. Time will shew whether such maxims as these, if adopted, would not be of more service to us than a thousand homilies on the natural rights of other countries, the progress of civilization, or on "the great ameliorations which are about to take place among the nations of the world."\*

\* See the Monthly Review for September. Writers in every age have indulged in such prophecies as this—great ameliorations have always been "*about to take place*," but it has unfortunately happened that events have seldom responded to such favourable anticipations, and we may without hesitation place all such predictions in the same class as those with which the learned Thomas Moore, Gent., annually favours the public. It is true that some epochs have been conspicuous for a material, others for an intellectual development, and a few for both ; but man, as a moral agent, has generally remained the same—in some ages a little better, in others a little worse—always a slave to the same good and evil passions which are the joint effects of his organization and the material causes by which it is influenced. When any perceptible amelioration has taken place in this respect, it has only been when this organization has undergone a slight modification by the fusion of different races, or when the dormant energies of a race have been awakened into action by its migration to a more genial climate. It was such causes which produced the Greeks and Romans, and the vigorous nations of the Middle Ages, thus giving rise to three of the most brilliant epochs in the annals of mankind—the epochs of Greek intelligence, Roman policy, and Feudal chivalry ; and it is only when such causes come into operation, that we can be authorized to expect that "great ameliorations are about to take place." Even then they will be very slight, and if we consider mankind as a whole, scarcely perceptible. For in order to render man the perfect being which philanthropists dream of, and which they fondly imagine that their homilies and institutions will enable him to become, much greater causes than

I have also been blamed for recommending a rupture of the present quasi-alliance with France,

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these would be required ; his whole physical organization would have to be modified, and the nervous system further developed. But then he would become more than man : he would enter into a superior class of beings, and must be placed in a world whose elements were more etherialized into harmony than in this which he now occupies. That such superior beings exist in other planets is, I might almost say, a physical certainty—if certainty in such matters could be grounded on any thing better than on mere conjectural analogy—for he who imagines that Almighty Power has breathed into such an imperfect being as man all the spiritual essence which mortality is capable of supporting, must assuredly be the vainest creature in existence, and totally ignorant of the great phenomena of nature. A slight knowledge of the natural sciences will, in fact, be sufficient to convince us that the planet which we inhabit, with every thing which belongs to it, is in a state of progressive development. The astonishing variety of animated beings which people its surface may be viewed as one great material organization, endued with an immaterial mind, which begins to manifest itself in the faint glimmerings of intelligence which accompany the first appearance of the nervous system in the radiata, and is gradually developed along with this system, through the collateral branches of molluscous and articulated animals to the vertebrata, until it attains its full earthly maturity in man, but shews, at the same time, by the imperfections which are apparent, even when it shines forth in its greatest splendour in the sublime conceptions of a Newton, or the mild virtues of a Fenelon, that it is still capable of much further development, a development which it probably undergoes in other worlds, always approaching nearer to that Supreme Intelligence which presides over the universe, and to which it is allied by its immateriality.

It is even probable that mind is destined to undergo such a development in this planet. Geology proves that there was a time, comparatively recent, when man and the superior classes of animals

though it is now very questionable whether such an alliance may be said to exist,\* while the very

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did not exist, and consequently, when mind was much less developed than it is at present. Analogical reasoning will therefore warrant the presumption, that this immaterial faculty will be still further developed, along with the planet into which it is infused ; and in ages far too remote for human calculation, will give rise to beings infinitely superior to any at present in existence.

What are the 6000 years of history, and the ameliorations which they have produced, in comparison to these grand physical epochs, and the wonderful phenomena of spiritual essence?—an essence which all the sophisms of Materialists and Atheists will never be able to do away with. Whatever they may attempt to prove to the contrary, mind and matter will always remain distinct ; the matter of the nervous system is one thing, and the mind, spirit, or soul which sets that matter in motion another : the immateriality of the one can be proved as clearly as the materiality of the other ; or, to speak more properly, both are subject to the same difficulties. But I must not enter further into this interesting subject, such disquisitions being somewhat misplaced in a political pamphlet.

I merely wished to shew that if by “ the great ameliorations which are about to take place among the nations of the world ” be meant moral ameliorations, the supposition is totally unwarranted. Material ameliorations may, and no doubt will, take place in most countries, but it does not by any means follow that “ the sciences of physics and morals, in the widest sense of the terms, ” should simultaneously “ gain a new elevation. ” History shews, on the contrary, that the Cosmological and Noological branches of science, though they spring from the same root, only flourish at each other’s cost ; following, in this respect, the general law of antagonism, which seems to pervade the universe. Hence, when we see great material improvements taking place in a country we may justly fear that morality is on the decline, though it may still strive to assume its natural semblance by wearing the mask of hypocrisy.

persons who blame me talk of "looking on her with a jealous eye,"† no over friendly proceeding certainly. As for Louis Philippe all parties appear to have thrown him overboard. The alliance is no longer between the French and English governments, it is an alliance between the French and English people, grounded on mutual esteem, and I suppose on philanthropic principles. But the people of France happen unfortunately to be divided into several parties and factions, and I ask those whose pæans are the loudest in praise of this famous alliance, On which of these parties do you rely? Is it on the Republicans or Carlists? Assuredly not, for their most accredited organs have openly and repeatedly avowed their unrelenting hostility to England. Is it on the *ci-devant* Imperialists? They are equally as hostile every *nuance* of them, from the courtiers who frequent the Tuileries down to the old ex-gardists who hasten to the Boulevard exhibitions of the life of their hero, and indulge in the fond illusion of one day seeing France able to wipe out the stain of Waterloo. Is it on the Doctrinaires? They, I

\* For the last three years I have repeatedly said that we ought not to place the least reliance in Louis Philippe and his *bourgeois* supporters. My friends at first laughed at me; afterwards began to suspect that my opinions were not altogether unfounded; and I suppose this last change of ministerial puppets will have completely opened their eyes, though the old tale will doubtless be repeated, and we shall be again assured that His Barricade Majesty still deigns to favour us with his friendly protection.

† See the Morning Advertiser for August 26.

suppose, are somewhat too Macchiavellic for you. In whom then, I ask, do you put your trust? You will be obliged to confess that it is only in the bankers and monied men, a class possessing far less influence than the corresponding one in this country, and which the least civil convulsion would overwhelm in an instant. And if to this class you even join a portion of the shopkeepers, you cannot ennoble your alliance by calling it an alliance with the French people, it will be at best little more than an alliance between the Chaussée d'Antin and Lombard-street—no great thing to boast of certainly.

But even this quasi-alliance with a tottering throne and the fraction of a nation might be of some use, were it not for ever destined to be a barren—nay, what is more, a fatal one. For there is one consideration to which I cannot too strongly call public attention, and which will shew us clearly into what an abyss this alliance is drawing us. It is the fact—in my opinion the undeniable fact—that its chief supporters in France, will only stick to it as long as it tends to preserve peace at any price. It is the fear of war and its consequences, and *not the fear of Russian aggrandizement*, which has induced them to approve of an alliance with England. But propose to them to change this quasi-alliance into a real offensive alliance against the Czar, and they will tell you that such a thing never entered into their calculations. They will tell you that the present *statu quo* must be *preserved*; and for every step which Russia takes

towards the accomplishment of her designs, and which causes you to fly to your Gallic friends for assistance, you will invariably get the same answer, that the actual *statu quo* of the time being must be preserved. This, and a few edifying discourses on the invaluable blessings of peace, is all that you will be ever able to obtain from those worthy friends of England, and firm supporters of his August Majesty, Louis Philippe—the *bons bourgeois* of France. This *statu quo* too will be according to French notions, which have generally something peculiar in them. For when you tell them that Russia is increasing her fleet, they will calmly reply, that France—in order to preserve the *statu quo*—is increasing her's in the same proportion. Should Russia order her armies to march into the principalities under the pretext of putting an end to disorders fomented by her own agents, and you in your fears again fly to these friends—the only friends, such as they are, whom you will have left—they will tell you, that disorders in any country endanger the peace of Europe, and that no one can regret more than they do that such a circumstance should have rendered it absolutely necessary for a Russian army to occupy Wallachia ; but that in order to counteract the effects of this occupation, France will send an army to the Morea, also in a dangerous state of fermentation, with the hope that these joint measures will restore tranquillity to those unhappy countries ; and under the firm persuasion that such a temporary occupa-

tion cannot possibly give the least umbrage to their faithful allies, who must be perfectly convinced that France has not the least wish for aggrandizement—the measures in contemplation being intended merely to counteract the designs of Russia, and to preserve the *statu quo*. Such will be the language of the *bourgeois* Government when this event—*now preparing*—shall take place; you, of course, acquiescing in any measures which such disinterested friends may think proper to propose. And when at length the Russian flag waves over the Seraglio, and the cross replaces the crescent on the domes of St. Sophia, and you begin to prepare for serious action, and make a last appeal to these worthy friends, they will say that the conquest of Turkey by Russia is certainly a *grand malheur*, but that it is a *fait accompli*, and that France will be obliged, in order to preserve the *statu quo*, to take possession of Egypt. Should this at last cause your English blood to boil in your veins—it ought to have done so long since—they will tell you that the best way to cool it will be by attacking Russia yourselves; for that if England fears Russia, France does not; being convinced that her African Empire, with this addition of Egypt, will be more than sufficient to neutralize the ill effects which might arise from the increase of Russian power, and that the peace of Europe will be preserved; a blessing which you will be obliged to admit cannot be purchased at too high a price.

This is what an alliance with France will in all

probability lead to, if Louis Philippe should continue a few years—and but a few years—longer on the throne. And if our statesmen should at length be convinced that no reliance can be placed in this wily monarch, and should wish to follow the true system of British policy and return to our natural allies, it will be too late. They will find these allies estranged ; they will find them either lulled into a fatal security, or completely intimidated ; either become blind enough to their own interests to reject the proffered alliance, or in too great a dread of the consequences which would result from its acceptance. Their confidence in the power of England will, in a word, have been destroyed ; and they will have become, against their own inclinations, the mere tools of Russia and France. An armed neutrality will be the very utmost which English diplomacy will be able to effect ; any thing further will be impossible.

In this state of things we shall be obliged either to enter the lists against Continental Europe combined in arms against us, or to arouse the demon of Revolution, and shake the thrones of its monarchs to their foundations. This was the threat once held out by a celebrated statesman, a threat which, terrible as it is, some future Canning will perhaps be compelled to put in execution as a last and dreadful resource to save us from total destruction. But it will be an awful experiment, which, whether it succeed or not, will produce results equally destructive. For if we adopt such a system of policy,



we shall have to league with revolutionary Terrorism ; we shall have to plant the *bonnet rouge* on the glorious standard of Britain, and trail it through the mire of democratic licentiousness ; we shall have to stir up the basest passions of mankind, and fraternize with wretches polluted by every crime which degrades humanity. Our alliances will then indeed be founded on principles—on principles subversive of every acknowledged right, and which in every age and in every country in which they have been brought into operation, have never produced any thing durable save anarchy and despotism. These subversive principles too we shall be obliged to adopt ourselves ; for we cannot take a part in the orgies of political fanaticism without becoming contaminated ; we cannot urge on our associates to crime without first setting them the example. Once began, such a system must be followed up to its final consequences ; and then all the horrors it will have given rise to will recoil back on ourselves with tenfold fury. We shall then enter into that dark epoch in the annals of nations, that epoch of woe and desolation when statesmen turn pale and patriots tremble for their country—an epoch when Licentiousness parades the streets, while Faction rages in the senate—when laws are trampled under foot, and institutions subverted to appease the clamours of a party—when Virtue lies prostrate on the earth, and Vice in all her hideousness sits triumphant—while Popular Frenzy celebrates her execrable orgies, and all that is pure

and illustrious and noble and generous in the land falls in bloody hecatombs around her reeking altars. 'Tis then that all the elements of social life clash together in the wildest discord ; Anarchy and Terrorism spread devastation around ; until at length the last vial of wrath is poured out, and man, trembling with conscious guilt, hears announced amidst the thunders of heaven the awful doom—  
IT IS DONE.

This will be called an exaggerated picture, and the writer will be accused of Toryism as he has been accused of Macchiavellism. Be it so—it will be some consolation for him that those who know him, know also that he has been all his life and still continues to be, a sincere friend of rational liberty ; some little experience of the world, and a slight knowledge of history have however served to convince him that of all the various kinds of tyranny which ever existed, democratic tyranny is the worst, and he fears that unless mankind should become infinitely more virtuous and disinterested than they are at present—and he is sorry to say, that he cannot as yet perceive the least sign of amelioration—pure democratic institutions can have no other end.

It will no doubt be an easy task for any one to deny the premises on which these arguments are grounded—but their denial by others as their assumption by me will prove nothing, it is time alone which can shew whether they be well founded or not. But let it be granted that they are well founded, let it be granted that those in France

